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The Contemporaneous Ownership
Rule In New York
Through a shareholders' derivative action, one or more
shareholders of a corporation may bring suit to enforce a corpo-
rate right when the corporation, by its board of directors, refuses
to take appropriate action to pursue such right for its own gain
or protection.1 The courts devised this right in order to provide
judicial access for any shareholder who had suffered an indirect
injury because of the diminished value of his holdings in the cor-
poration, but who could not compel the board of directors to
bring suit.2 Both courts and legislatures have adopted rules
designed to clarify the limited purpose of derivative actions and
curtail potential abuses.3
1. See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 105 (1945). See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 358-376 (2d ed. 1970); N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS 410-62 (2d ed. 1971). See also Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 380-
81 (2d Cir. 1928). In the United States, the courts created the "derivative" right to ac-
commodate "the concept of the corporation as a separate right-holding entity" and "the
idea that the shareholder had a right to judicial protection of his interests when jeopard-
ized by a defaulting management." Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes
On Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 980, 992 (1957).
2. Before the federal courts may entertain a shareholders' derivative action, the
complaint must include allegations of the efforts made, if any, to compel the board of
directors or shareholders of the corporation to take appropriate action for the protection
of the corporation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The failure to make a prior demand on the
directors or shareholders is generally excused if the directors or shareholders themselves
are the alleged wrongdoers. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957) (directors ap-
proved contract injurious to corporation). In New York, the complaint in a shareholders'
derivative action must allege any efforts made to secure action by the board of directors
and, if no efforts were made, the reasons for such inaction. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c)
(McKinney 1963). No demand need be made on the shareholders of the corporation. Id.
The failure to make a prior demand on the board of directors is excused if such demand
would be futile. See Continental Secs. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912)
(alleged wrongdoers controlled the corporation).
If the corporation does take the appropriate action, a derivative action is no longer
necessary. If the board of directors' decision not to institute a suit was made with sound
business judgment, a derivative action will be dismissed in most instances. See Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980). The exception to this principle is the case in
which the directors are alleged to have authorized or approved the transaction and are
defendants in the suit. Id. at 58-62. See generally Dent, The Power of Directors to Ter-
minate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96,
98-105 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (indicating that the corporation is
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The contemporaneous ownership rule ("Rule"), one of the
more problematic of these formulations, has been codified in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 and legislatively or judicially
adopted in some form by most states.5 In New York, the Rule is
a necessary party to a derivative action); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 344-45, 356
(1855) (emphasizing the requirement that the shareholder demand corporate action prior
to his institution of the derivative suit); Paulson v. Margolis, 234 A.D. 496, 255 N.Y.S.
568 (1st Dep't 1932) (indicating that the corporation is a necessary party to a derivative
action). FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (complaint must allege that the action is not a collusive one
to gain jurisdiction; action may not be "dismissed or compromised" without court ap-
proval); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963) (court approval required before
the action may be "discontinued, compromised or settled"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative action who holds
less than 5% of any class of shares must post security for the corporation's reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, unless such shares have a fair market value in excess
of fifty thousand dollars). See also note 37 and accompanying text infra.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corpora-
tion or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted
by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and
(2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the
United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it ap-
pears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corpo-
ration or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
The federal courts' contemporaneous ownership rule originated in Hawes v. Oak-
land, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See notes 8-10 and accompanying text infra. The Court codi-
fied the Hawes decision a year later as Equity Rule 94. See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE T 23.1.01[4] (2d ed. 1979). See also Venner v. Great N. Ry., 209 U.S. 24 (1908); City
of Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887). In 1912, Equity Rule 94, in a slightly modified
form, became Equity Rule 27. 3B MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTicE 1 23.1.01[4] (2d ed. 1979).
In 1938, Equity Rule 27 became Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
In 1966, Rule 23 was revised and renumbered to become present Rule 23.1. Id. As part of
this most recent revision, the rules governing derivative suits were separated from the
rules governing class actions, and provisions which had dealt with settlements and dis-
missals of class actions were incorporated into the derivative suit rule. Id. The purpose
of this final change was to restrict strike suits. Id. See notes 12-13 and accompanying
text infra.
5. Each of the following jurisdictions has enacted a contemporaneous ownership
statute similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 52-572j
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/7
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embodied in section 626(b) of the Business Corporation Law:
(West Supp. 1980); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1974) (also DEL. CH. CT. R.
23.1 adopted by the Chancellor Dec. 29, 1947); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.147 (West
1977); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 22-615 (1977); Illinois, Act of July 9, 1975, § 45a, Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.45a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 496A.43
(1975); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.245 (Supp. 1978); Louisiana, LA. CODE CIV.
PRO. ANN. art. 596 (West 1960); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 46
(West 1970) (applies only to actions against "stockholders, directors or officers of the
corporation as such"); Michigan, MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1491 (1973); Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-93 (1972); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.070 (Vernon 1952);
Montana, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2243 (1967); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2047 (1977); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (West 1969 & Supp. 1979-1980); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-47 (Supp. 1979) (also N.M. R. Civ. P. 23.1, adopted
Nov. 1, 1978); New York, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963); North Caro-
lina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55 (1975); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-48 (1976);
Ohio, OHIO R. Civ. P. 23.1; Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 2203 (1978); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-43.1 (1970); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-718 (1979);
Texas, TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon 1980); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-103 (1975); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-141.1 (Supp. 1979).
Each of the following jurisdictions has enacted a contemporaneous ownership stat-
ute similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, but each statute expressly provides for a "continuing
wrong" exception to the general rule, see notes 74-90 and accompanying text infra:
Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 627 (1974); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405
(West 1957).
Both the California and the Pennsylvania contemporaneous ownership statutes are
significantly different from the federal rule. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977) provides
that one who was not an owner at the time of the alleged wrong may, after a preliminary
showing to the court of five factors, in the court's discretion, maintain a derivative ac-
tion. The statute provides a continuing wrong rationale and specifically grants standing
to beneficial owners of shares. Pennsylvania has both a statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1516 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1979-1980), and a court adopted rule, PA. R. Civ. P. 1506.
Rule 1506, which was adopted in 1952, is essentially similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
Section 1516, which was enacted in 1963 as P.L. 1355 § 1 and which is narrower in scope
than Rule 1506, applies only to suits against officers, directors, or former officers or di-
rectors of a corporation. The section provides that the court may, upon preliminary
showings of a strong prima facie case and of injustice if a derivative suit is not permitted,
allow suit to be maintained even though the contemporaneous ownership criterion is not
satisfied. For further discussion of the California and Pennsylvania statutes, see notes
94-97 and accompanying text infra.
Each of the following states has, by order of its highest court, adopted a procedural
rule similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1: Alabama, ALA. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Arizona, ARIz. R. Civ.
P. 23.1; Arkansas, ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Colorado, COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Indiana, IND.
TRIAL RuLE 23.1; Kansas, KAN. CIv. PROC. R. 60-223a; Minnesota, MINN. R. Civ. P.
23.06; Nevada, Nv. R. Civ. P. 23.1; South Dakota, S.D. R. Civ. P. 15-6-23.1.
Maryland has adopted, by case law, a contemporaneous ownership rule similar to
the federal rule. Eisler v. Eastern States Corp., 182 Md. 329, 35 A.2d 118 (1943).
ALASKA STAT. § 10.15.200 (1968) governs actions brought by a member or share-
holder to vindicate a right of a cooperative; it requires contemporaneous ownership but
employs the continuing wrong rationale. Alaska has no statute or rule governing share-
holders' derivative actions brought to vindicate a right of a corporation.
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[In a shareholders' derivative action], it shall be made to appear
that the plaintiff is .. .a holder ["of shares or of voting trust
certificates. . . or of a beneficial interest in such shares or certifi-
cates"] at the time of bringing the action and that he was such a
holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or
that his shares or his interest therein devolved upon him by op-
eration of law.7
This comment analyzes the development and operation of
the Rule; the circumstances in which application of the Rule op-
erates to deny legal relief to aggrieved shareholders; and the cir-
cumstances in which the operation of the Rule, in conjunction
with other statutes, results in arbitrary, disparate treatment of
shareholders. Finally, the comment proposes a modification of
the New York statute to create a presumption in favor of appli-
cation of the Rule, but to allow a shareholder to rebut the pre-
sumption in cases in which application of the Rule would result
in an injustice.
I. Evolution of the Contemporaneous Ownership
Rule in New York
The contemporaneous ownership rule originated in 1881
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Hawes v. Oakland;8 the
Court held that, to sue derivatively in federal court, a plaintiff-
shareholder must have owned his shares at the time of the al-
leged wrongs, or his shares must have subsequently devolved
upon him by operation of law.9 The decision in Hawes was
6. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(a) (McKinney 1963).
7. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added). New York
courts have permitted derivative actions brought by holders of shares which passed to
the holders by virtue of either testate or intestate succession after the date of the trans-
action which provides the basis for their complaint. See, e.g., Phillips v. Bradford, 62
F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Salter v. Columbia Concerts, Inc., 191 Misc. 479, 77
N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948). Cf. Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694 (7th
Cir. 1971) (stock ownership which was litigated subsequent to the death of the testator
and was settled by an agreement between the executor and the plaintiff "sufficiently
approximated a devolution by operation of law" to satisfy requirements of Rule 23.1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). But see Myer v. Myer, 271 A.D. 465, 66 N.Y.S.2d
83 (1st Dep't 1946) (acquisition of shares by a trust agreement cannot be considered a
transfer by operation of law), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
8. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).




designed to deal with a problem unique to the federal system:
the practice of obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction in a deriv-
ative action simply by transferring shares to a nonresident who
would then bring the action.10
After Hawes, several state courts, although not faced with
the specific jurisdictional issue that gave rise to the Supreme
Court decision, adopted the contemporaneous ownership rule in
an attempt to eliminate certain abuses associated with deriva-
tive litigation.' The derivative strike suit was of particular con-
cern. In a strike suit, the plaintiff initiated a shareholder's deriv-
ative action to gain a lucrative personal settlement, rather than
to benefit the corporation. 2 The corporation might be forced
into such a settlement, even if the suit had no substantive basis,
in order to prevent expensive and protracted litigation, to pro-
tect the corporation's public and private image, and to preclude
possible exposure of important corporate secrets.'3 Further, even
10. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453, 459-60 (1881). See City of Quincy v. Steel,
120 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1887). See generally Seasongood, Right of a Stockholder, Suing in
Behalf of a Corporation, to Complain of Misdeeds Occurring Prior to His Acquisition of
Stock, 21 HAIIv. L. Rav. 195, 198-200 (1907); Note, Corporate Incapacity to Sue Where
Stockholders Would Be Barred From Suing Derivatively-The Vicarious Incapacity
Rule: A Public Interest Exception, 54 B.U.L. Rgv. 355, 367-68 (1974); 23 TEMP. L.Q. 82,
82-84 (1949).
11. See, e.g., Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 P. 634 (1907) (purchase of stock
for purpose of litigating past transactions should not be encouraged); Home Fire Ins. Co.
v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903) (application of the Rule prevents unjust
enrichment of subsequent purchaser).
Other courts rejected adoption of the Rule. See, e.g., Montgomery Light Co. v. La-
hey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. 1006 (1899) (Rule is one of practice and not a general principle
of law); Just v. Idaho Canal & Improvement Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 P. 381 (1909) (Rule is
one of federal practice and should only be applied in state courts when stock was pur-
chased for purpose of bringing suit or when vendor was estopped from bringing suit);
Appleton v. American Malting Co., 65 N.J. Eq. 375, 54 A. 454 (1903) (innocent purchaser
should not be estopped) (dictum); Rafferty v. Donnelly, 197 Pa. 423, 47 A. 202 (1900)
(right to sue on behalf of the corporation is an incident of stock ownership).
12. "A 'strike suit' is an action brought by a security holder, not in good faith, but,
through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force the payment of a sum dispropor-
tionate to the normal value of his interest as the price of discontinuance." Note, Extor-
tionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. Rv. 1308, 1308 (1934)
(footnotes deleted). See Myer v. Myer, 271 A.D. 465, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1946),
aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
13. One commentator noted:
While the derivative action serves a useful purpose, it is susceptible to abuse
by "strike-suits" or "blackmail by litigation" when brought by small shareholders




if the suit were meritorious, the corporation and the sharehold-
ers as a group would not benefit from the litigation if the pro-
ceeds of the settlement were to go to the individual plaintiff. A
contemporaneous ownership rule eliminates the possibility that
a plaintiff will purchase shares, after an alleged corporate
wrongdoing, for the sole purpose of threatening or initiating a
strike suit.
Another concern underlying adoption of the Rule was fear
of potential unjust enrichment to the subsequent purchaser who,
at the time of his stock purchase, had knowledge of prior corpo-
rate wrongdoing or knowledge of the corporate worth subse-
quent to the wrongdoing.14 This concern was enunciated in an
early federal case:
[T]he purchaser of stock in a corporation is not allowed to attack
the acts and management of the company prior to the acquisition
of his stock; otherwise, we might have a case where stock duly
represented in a corporation consented to and participated in bad
management and waste, and, after reaping the benefits from such
transactions, could be easily passed into the hands of a subse-
quent purchaser, who could make his harvest by appearing and
contesting the very acts and conduct which his vendor had con-
sented to.16
legitimate or not, are often protracted, time-consuming for corporate manage-
ment, and very expensive. Nuisance actions, private settlements with the corpora-
tion buying off the complainant, and other misuses of the derivative remedy led to
various restrictions being placed upon it.
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 358, at 752 (2d ed. 1970) (footnotes
deleted). See note 4 supra.
14. See United Elec. Secs. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Light Co., 68 F. 673 (C.C.E.D. La.
1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). In Barber, Dean
Pound's decision indicated that the purpose of the federal rule was not limited to juris-
dictional problems but was also based on preventing equity from being used to achieve
unjust results. Id. at 657-58, 93 N.W. at 1029. This view predated the incorporation into
the federal rule of other sections which indicate this intent more clearly. See note 4
supra.
15. United Elec. Secs. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Light Co., 68 F. 673, 675 (C.C.E.D. La.
1895). In United Electric, the plaintiff, who was a stockholder in the defendant com-
pany, sued to have a receiver appointed to manage the defendant. The court found the
plaintiff to be a "bona fide stockholder" of the defendant company with standing to sue.
Id. Although the case was not a derivative action, the court, in dictum quoted herein,
expressed its concern that a purchaser of shares might be unjustly enriched if contempo-
raneity of ownership were not a prerequisite to a derivative suit. In United Electric, the
court appears to focus on possible collusion: a seller reaps the benefits of his wrongdoing
and "easily" passes his stock to a litigious purchaser. Id.
[Vol. 1:215
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In the situation in which the purchaser has knowledge of prior
The dictum from United Electric was quoted and explained in Dean Pound's deci-
sion in Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). Although Bar-
ber, too, was not a derivative action, the court found that "the stockholders [were] the
real and substantial beneficiaries of a recovery," id. at 670, 93 N.W. at 1033, and there-
fore focused upon the stockholders' standing to challenge corporate wrongdoing which
had occurred prior to their stock acquisition.
In Barber, the defendants had been incorporators and stockholders of the plaintiff
company. Defendant Barber, as secretary and general manager of the plaintiff company,
had controlled its management. In order to retain control of the corporation, the defen-
dants bought out a rival faction using funds borrowed from banks. To repay these loans,
however, the defendants borrowed from the corporation without proper security. These
and other loans remained on the plaintiff's books while the defendants received profits
and divideneds on the stock purchased. Barber then sold all stock in the plaintiff corpo-
ration to one Funkhouser and his associates, pursuant to a contract that also required
Barber to present Funkhouser with an accurate and complete financial statement for the
company.
After transfer of control, the new management sued in the corporate name to re-
cover for losses to the corporation caused by Barber's mismanagement in collecting prof-
its on the stock bought with corporate funds, and for other acts of mismanagement and
conversion. The plaintiffs did not allege that the financial statement was inaccurate. The
court noted that "a purchaser of stock cannot complain of the prior acts and manage-
ment of the corporation," id. at 656, 93 N.W. at 1028, quoted from United Electric, and
then explained the applicability of the United Electric dictum to this case:
[T]he present stockholders are contesting acts through which they get title to a
large portion of their stock, and acts which those through whom they derived the
greater part of the remainder could not have challenged because they participated
therein, and, by contesting these acts, which did not injure any of the present
stockholders in the least, are recovering back a large part of the purchase price of
stock which was admittedly worth all that they paid for it.
Id. at 656-57, 93 N.W. at 1029.
Thus, Barber construes the United Electric language to support the theory that a
contemporaneous ownership rule is necessary to prevent a purchaser from gaining a re-
bate on his purchase price. Since Funkhouser knew the state of the plaintiff's finances
when he bought the stock, allowing the corporation to recover for Barber's mismanage-
ment would amount to allowing Funkhouser and his associates to recover part of their
purchase price. At the time of suit, Funkhouser and his associates were the only holders
of stock in the plaintiff corporation and therefore would be unjustly enriched by any
increase in the value of their stockholdings.
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroos-
took R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), relied on Barber in dismissing a suit brought in the name
of the corporation by the present owner of 99% of the shares of the corporation to re-
cover for acts of mismanagement that had occurred prior to the plaintiff's purchase. The
Court found that the plaintiff-shareholder could not have sued derivatively since it
would have been the principal beneficiary of any recovery and should be precluded
"from reaping a windfall by enhancing the value of its bargain." Id. at 716. Thus, the
unjust enrichment rationale has been acknowledged and affirmed by the Supreme Court
as underlying the federal contemporaneous ownership requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23.1.
For a further discussion of Bangor Punta, see note 66 infra.
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wrongdoing, this statement appears to attack possible collusion
between a seller and a purchaser of shares: a seller who partici-
pates in corporate mismanagement for his own personal benefit
might then sell his shares to a knowing purchaser who could sue
derivatively and expect a lucrative personal settlement. In the
situation in which the purchaser has knowledge of the corporate
worth, the statement appears to attack possible inequitable gain
to the purchaser through a rebate on his purchase price: a pur-
chaser might pay a price reflecting the diminished value of the
stockholdings and then later sue derivatively, thereby either in-
creasing the value of his holdings or obtaining a lucrative per-
sonal settlement.16
Other courts justified adoption of the Rule under a theory
that the right to sue derivatively is personal to the shareholder
at the time of injury and is not transferable to a subsequent pur-
chaser.1 7 These courts reasoned that the right to sue derivatively
accrues only to those shareholders who voted against, or ex-
pressed disapproval of, the corporate transaction now the sub-
ject of the lawsuit, and that, therefore, the right to sue cannot be
transferred to subsequent purchasers.
Prior to Hawes, the New York trial and intermediate appel-
late courts had refused to require contemporaneous ownership;"
Hawes did not cause them to alter their position on the issue.19
16. These theories of potential unjust enrichment appear to place a heavy burden on
the prospective purchaser of shares to discover any prior corporate mismanagement
before his purchase and either to refrain from purchasing or to adjust his purchase price
accordingly. Once the purchase is completed, the purchaser can have no redress for prior
mismanagement.
17. See, e.g., Russell v. Louis Melind Co., 331 II. App. 182, 72 N.E.2d 869 (1947);
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). See also 23 Temp. L.Q.
82 (1949).
18. This line of cases began with Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Tioga County 1870), which asserted that that when a plaintiff brings suit for alleged
misconduct by company officers for acts done before the plaintiff purchased stock, "[t]he
relative rights of the parties are the same as if the suit were brought by the plaintiff's
vendor." Id. at 404. See Young v. Drake, 8 Hun. 61, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dep't 1876).
19. See Frothingham v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R., 9 N.Y. Civ. Proc. R. 304,
304-15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1886); O'Connor v. Virginia Passenger & Power Co., 46
Misc. 530, 92 N.Y.S. 525 (Sup. Ct. Washington County), aff'd, 107 A.D. 630, 95 N.Y.S.
1149 (1905), rev'd on other grounds, 184 N.Y. 46, 76 N.E. 1082 (1906); Sayles v. Central
Nat'l Bank, 18 Misc. 155, 158, 41 N.Y.S. 1063, 1063-64 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1896),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sayles v. White, 18 A.D. 590, 46 N.Y.S. 194 (4th Dep't




These New York courts viewed the right to sue derivatively as
an integral and inseparable attribute of stock ownership.2 To
hold otherwise, stated one court, "would be reversing the rule
that the transfer of property includes the ownership of all inci-
dents thereto. 21
In a 1911 decision, Pollitz v. Gould, the New York Court of
Appeals endorsed the lower courts' opinions and rationale and
rejected the contemporaneous ownership rule in derivative ac-
tions.2 2 While recognizing the adoption of the Rule by both the
Supreme Court and other state courts,2" the court of appeals
nevertheless concluded that the right to sue was a necessary in-
cident of stock ownership that should not be cut off with the
transfer of the stock: "As an original proposition it would seem
to be clear that a right of action by or in behalf of the corpora-
tion for fraud . . . is part of its rights, property and assets in
which a stockholder has this indivisible interest transferable by
the transfer of his certificates. 2 4 Moreover, the court explicitly
rejected the two arguments most often given to support the con-
temporaneous ownership rule. First, the court found inapposite
the theory of unjust enrichment:2 5 a stockholder might as easily
have paid a premium for the stock in anticipation of the wrong
Dep't 1885); Kingman v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburgh R.R., 30 Hun. 73, 73 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1883).
These decisions are divided on the issue of whether a purchase with intent to sue
affects the purchaser's rights. Two of them, in apparent reference to the strike suit, indi-
cated that the contemporaneous ownership requirement might be applied if the share-
holder purchased his interest for the specific purpose of bringing an action. O'Connor v.
Virginia Passenger & Power Co., 46 Misc. 530, 536, 92 N.Y.S. 525, 528 (Sup. Ct. Wash-
ington County 1905); Sayles v. Central Nat'l Bank, 18 Misc. 155, 158, 41 N.Y.S. 1063,
1065 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1896). In Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Tioga County 1870), however, an attorney had purchased stock for the specific purpose
of bringing suit. The court held that this was no bar to action: "His buying the stock and
bonds was no wrong done [to the defendants], with whatever intent it was done." Id. at
404. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co. also indirectly supports the right to sue
regardless of the intent with which after-acquired shares were purchased. 35 Hun. 544,
546-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't 1885).
20. See, e.g., Young v. Drake, 8 Hun. 61, 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d Dep't 1876). See also
cases cited in note 19 supra.
21. Frothingham v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R., 9 N.Y. Civ. Proc. R. 304, 315
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1886).
22. 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911).
23. Id. at 14, 94 N.E. at 1088.
24. Id. at 15, 94 N.E. at 1089.
25. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
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being corrected and the stock's value increasing, as he might
have adjusted the price downward.2" Second, the court found to-
tally without merit the theory that a stockholder must person-
ally disapprove a corporate transaction in order to bring a deriv-
ative action and that this personal right of election is non-
transferable,2 7 the court maintained that the right is not per-
sonal, but attaches solely to the status of a stockholder.2 8
The Pollitz court made it clear, however, that in some spe-
cial circumstances a contemporaneous ownership rule might be
appropriate. The court suggested that it would apply the Rule if
a stockholder gave "binding consent" to a particular transaction
and subsequently sold his shares to a purchaser who intended to
bring litigation attacking the same transaction.2 9 Apparently, the
court was concerned about possible collusion between the pur-
chaser and the seller of the stock. 0
The Pollitz rule remained law in New York"1 until 1944. In
that year, the legislature, apparently accepting the recommenda-
tions of a New York Chamber of Commerce report that had
demonstrated significant strike suit abuse within the state,3' en-
26. Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 16, 94 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1911).
27. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
28. Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. at 18, 94 N.E. at 1089-90.
29. Id. at 16, 94 N.E. at 1089.
30. For a discussion of similar reasoning by another court, see note 15 and accompa-
nying text supra.
31. See, e.g., Continental Secs. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912);
Osann v. Jones, 209 A.D. 9, 204 N.Y.S. 242 (2d Dep't 1924); Turner v. American Metal
Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942), rev'd, 268 A.D. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800
(1st Dep't 1944), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y. 822, 66 N.E.2d 591, (1946); Koch v. Estes,
146 Misc. 249, 262 N.Y.S. 23 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 240 A.D. 829, 266 N.Y.S. 1008
(1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 480, 191 N.E. 525 (1934); Brennan v. Barnes, 133 Misc.
340, 232 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1928).
32. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders' Derivative Suits (Special
Committee on Corporate Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York 1944). The study analyzed 1,266 shareholder derivative law suits filed in the Su-
preme Court of the New York Appellate Division for the first and second departments
and the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York from 1932 to 1942
and noted various problems and abuses related to these actions. It concluded that a
number of strike suits had been initiated and suggested remedial legislative measures.
While relatively little history indicates the weight accorded the Wood report by the
legislature, additional evidence supports a conclusion that the main purpose for enacting
the statute was the prevention of strike suits. See Governor's Memorandum filed with
Senate Bills, Nos. 1314 and 1315, April 9, 1944, quoted in W. CARY, CAsEs AND MATFm-
ALS ON CoRPoRAnoNs 932 (4th ed. 1969).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss1/7
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acted a contemporaneous ownership statute in substantially the
form now included in section 626(b).33 The New York statute,
like the federal rule, is broad in scope: no shareholder may bring
a derivative action to redress corporate wrongs occurring prior to
the acquisition of his interest unless his interest devolved upon
him by operation of law."
In enacting the statute, the legislature failed to distinguish
between shareholder investments in large and small corpora-
tions, although the Chamber of Commerce Report had proposed
33. The rule is now embodied in § 626 of the New York Business Corporation Law
which is entitled, "Shareholders' derivative action brought in the right of the corporation
to procure a judgment in its favor." Section 626 provides:
(a) An action may be brought in the right of a domestic or foreign corpora-
tion to procure a judgment in its favor, by a holder of shares or of voting trust
certificates of the corporation or of a beneficial interest in such shares or
certificates.
(b) In any such action, it shall be made to appear that the plaintiff is such a
holder at the time of bringing the action and that he was such a holder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains, or that his shares or his interest therein
devolved upon him by operation of law.
(c) In any such action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the
efforts of the plaintiff to secure the initiation of such action by the board or the
reasons for not making such effort.
(d) Such action shall not be discontinued, compromised or settled, without
the approval of the court having jurisdiction of the action. If the court shall deter-
mine that the interests of the shareholders or any class or classes thereof will be
substantially affected by such discontinuance, compromise, or settlement, the
court, in its discretion, may direct that notice, by publication or otherwise, shall
be given to the shareholders or class or classes thereof whose interests it deter-
mines will be so affected; if notice is so directed to be given, the court may deter-
mine which one or more of the parties to the action shall bear the expense of
giving the same, in such amount as the court shall determine and find to be rea-
sonable in the circumstances, and the amount of such expense shall be awarded as
special costs of the action and recoverable in the same manner as statutory taxa-
ble costs.
(e) If the action on behalf of the corporation was successful, in whole or in
part, or if anything was received by the plaintiff or plaintiffs or a claimant or
claimants as the result of a judgment, compromise or settlement of an action or
claim, the court may award the plaintiff or plaintiffs, claimant or claimants, rea-
sonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, and shall direct him or
them to account to the corporation for the remainder of the proceeds so received
by him or them. This paragraph shall not apply to any judgment rendered for the
benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to a recovery of the loss or dam-
age sustained by them.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963) (originally §§ (a) and (b) were part of the
GEN. CORP. LAW § 61).
34.1 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
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such a distinction.3 5 The legislature also rejected an alternative
remedial proposal advanced by the New York Law Revision
Commission that would have prohibited personal settlement or
abandonment of derivative actions without prior court approval
and notice to all shareholders." A subsequent revision in 1961
35. The Wood report concluded that derivative action abuses were more prevalent
in large, publicly held corporations than in closely held corporations. See Wood, supra
note 32, at 31. In a large corporation, corporate interests are often widely held and are
readily transferable on the securities exchanges or over-the-counter markets. Sharehold-
ers generally take no active part in the corporate management and often invest relatively
small amounts of money. Generally, a closely held corporation has few shareholders, and
each shareholder has a substantial investment in the corporation. The shareholders gen-
erally invest not only money, but also time in the management of corporate affairs. In
addition, access to shares by "outsiders" is limited: the shares are not publicly traded,
and limitations on sales outside of the immediate group may exist. Accordingly, the New
York legislature might have considered tailoring the contemporaneous ownership rule to
large, publicly held corporations.
36. The Commission modeled its recommendation on the last sentence of Federal
Rule 23.1. See note 4 supra. In addition, it proposed amending subdivision 3 of section
193 of the Civil Practice Act to permit, as a matter of right, intervention by another
shareholder whenever the court determined that his interests were not being adequately
represented.
The Commission's recommendations follow:
I. The enactment of the following new section 63 of the General Corporation
Law:
§ 63. A derivative action heretofore or hereafter commenced by a
stockholder or member of any domestic or foreign corporation shall not be
discontinued or compromised nor dismissed by consent, by default or for
failure to prosecute, without the approval of the court, after notice of the
proposed discontinuance, dismissal or compromise shall have been given to
the stockholders or members of the corporation in such manner as the court
shall direct.
II. The amendment of subdivision 3 of section 193 of the Civil Practice Act to
read as follows:
3. Where a person not a party to the action has an interest in the
subject thereof, or in real property the title to which may in any manner be
affected by the judgment, or in real property for injury to which the com-
plaint demands relief, and makes application to the court to be made a
party, it must direct him to be brought in by the proper amendment.
In a derivative action heretofore or hereafter commenced by a stock-
holder or member of any domestic or foreign corporation, all other stock-
holders or members of the corporation shall be deemed persons interested
in the subject of the action, but shall be permitted to intervene only upon
timely application and if it appears that representation of their interests is
or may be inadequate.
Reports, Recommendations and Studies of the New York Law Rev. Comm. [1942] Leg.




did not affect the contemporaneous ownership requirement, but
prohibited settlements without court consent and codified a ju-
dicial prohibition against individual recovery."
Section 626(b) has thus remained substantially unchanged
since 1944. Despite the fact that a strike suit may not be the
motivation for a particular action, and that some inequities may
occur when the Rule is applied, 8 the statute enumerates no ex-
ceptions and allows no additional circumstances to be consid-
ered in determining the shareholder's right to sue derivatively.5 9
II. Problems Caused by the New York
Contemporaneous Ownership Statute
Section 626(b) of the New York Business Corporation Law
may operate to deny relief to some aggrieved shareholders."0
Under New York law at the time of the Commission's recommendations, a class
action brought by one class member was entirely within the control of the named plain-
tiff, subject only to intervention by another member of the class. Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald,
157 N.Y. 166, 51 N.E. 997 (1898). Under this rule, the plaintiff was completely free to
settle or discontinue the action. Recommendations, supra at 475.
This rule did not extend in its entirety to shareholders' derivative actions. While a
shareholder-plaintiff could discontinue the action for private gain, Manufacturers' Mut.
Fire Ins. Corp. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940),
af'd, 262 A.D. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 668, 43 NE.2d 71 (1942),
New York courts required judicial approval of a settlement of the action. Recommenda-
tions, supra at 475. Upon judicial approval, the settlement bound both the corporation
and all other shareholders. Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Secs. Corp., 154
Misc. 615, 276 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933), affd, 241 A.D. 717, 269 N.Y.S.
1007 (1st Dep't 1934), aft'd, 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
The Commission believed its proposal was necessary to avoid "[t]he institution of
ill-considered or unwarranted suits, multiplicity of litigation, abuse of the stockholders'
derivative action for private gain." Recommendations, supra at 475 (emphasis added).
37. Although the New York legislature initially failed to adopt the Commission's
recommendations, the New York Court of Appeals, apparently recognizing the impor-
tance of the Commission's criticisms, reversed the rule that had previously permitted
personal settlements of derivative actions. In Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71
N.E.2d 443 (1947), the court analogized the shareholder to a corporate fiduciary and held
that any derivative recovery, whether by judgment, settlement, or compromise, belonged
not to the individual shareholder but to the corporation, the real party in interest. This
judicially created rule, together with the Commission's suggested prohibition against
abandonment, compromise, or settlement of derivative actions without court approval,
has since been adopted by the legislature as part of the New York Business Corporation
Law. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §§ 626(d)-626(e) (McKinney 1963). See note 33 supra.
38. See notes 40-90 and accompanying text infra.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text infra.
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Moreover, its application may result in the denial of relief to
some shareholders while other shareholders, who either control
the board of directors or are directors or officers of the corpora-
tion, may obtain relief. 1 Further, whenever the courts attempt,
on a case by case basis, to avoid the inequities of the Rule, the
results appear unpredictable and ambiguous.'
A. Effective Denial of Any Legal Remedy
The following hypothetical illustrates how section 626(b)
can operate to deny judicial redress to an aggrieved shareholder.
Alpha Corporation is owned by two investors: A, who owns a
45 % interest, and B, who owns a 55 % interest. The three mem-
ber board of directors is elected and controlled by B. The corpo-
ration has been profitable over the last several years, and its
shares should therefore be worth substantially more than A's in-
itial investment. Unknown to A, however, B has made personal
use of the corporation's funds, thereby causing a depletion of the
corporate assets and an undiscovered impairment of the value of
A's stock. A subsequently sells his shares to C, an innocent pur-
chaser, without making any representations as to the value of
the corporation's assets. When C eventually discovers B's wrong-
ful actions, he may have no legal remedy for the resulting de-
cline in the value of his investment. C may not sue A, the seller,
under a theory of fraud because A did not know of the wasting
of assets.' Further, C cannot sue B for fraud because the latter
41. See notes 50-62 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 63-90 and accompanying text infra.
43. An action for intentional misrepresentation requires the following elements: a
knowing, false representation, usually of fact, made by the defendant with intent to in-
duce the plaintiff to act, resulting in justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and injury to
him. See, e.g., Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminium Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 151
N.E.2d 833, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1958). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971). A may have made some representation to C concerning
the value of the shares, but A could not have intended to deceive C as to the value of the
shares since A had no knowledge of their diminished value.
In some circumstances, liability can be established for negligent misrepresentation.
Such liability may be found when a relationship of trust or confidence establishes a duty
to represent accurately and that duty is breached. See, e.g., International Prods. Co. v.
Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (bailor-bailee relationship), cert. denied, 275 U.S.
527 (1927). Thus, to hold A liable for negligent misrepresentation, A must have had a
duty to C to make any representation accurately. In the hypothetical seller-buyer rela-




was not a party to the sale.44 C cannot cause Alpha Corporation
to sue B since C cannot control the actions of the board of
directors.48
Moreover, C cannot bring a derivative action. He is barred
by section 626(b), and, therefore, he must bear the loss on his
investment, even though he purchased his interest for invest-
ment, did not intend to initiate a strike suit, and was unaware of
the wasting of corporate assets. Application of the contempora-
neous ownership rule under these circumstances appears inequi-
table and does not further the legislative goal of preventing
strike suits.
A recent Delaware case, Nickson v. Filtrol Corp.," also il-
lustrates this inequity. Two stockholders, Slick Corporation and
one Nickson, brought a derivative action, alleging that the de-
fendant directors had caused the Filtrol Corporation to purchase
certain bonds, formerly held by one of the defendant directors,
at an excessive price. Slick Corporation's action was dismissed
for failure to meet the requirement of contemporaneous owner-
ship47 since Slick was not a stockholder in the defendant corpo-
Dorsey Prods. Corp. v. United States Rubber Co., 21 A.D.2d 866, 251 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1st
Dep't 1964) (negligent misrepresentations that induced plaintiff to enter distributorship
agreement with defendant imply relationship of trust beyond ordinary buyer-seller rela-
tionship; nevertheless, no duty found since agreement contained disclaimer clause), afl'd,
16 N.Y.2d 925, 212 N.E.2d 435, 264 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1965) with Coolite Corp. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 52 A.D.2d 486, 384 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1976) (negligent misrepresen-
tations that induced plaintiff to form corporation solely to market defendant's product
imply confidential relationship creating duty). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971).
44. To hold a defendant liable for a misrepresentation made to a third party, the
defendant must have made the misrepresentation to the third party for the dual purpose
of having the third party repeat it to the plaintiff and having the plaintiff act thereon.
See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See generally W. PRos-
sB, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, for B to be found liable
to C in an action for intentional misrepresentation brought by C, B would have had to
have made false representations to A concerning the value of the shares for the purpose
of having these falsities repeated to C, and in the hope that C would buy the shares on
the strength of the misrepresentations. In the hypothetical posed, B made no such false
representations; therefore, an action against him for misrepresentation would fail.
45. Under New York law, the affairs of a corporation, including any decision as to
whether suit should be brought in the corporate name, are generally under the direction
of its board of directors. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
46. 262 A.2d 267 (Del. Ch. 1970).




ration when the defendant purchased the bonds. The Chancellor
recognized that the contemporaneous ownership statute was
aimed at "prevention of the evil of purchasing stock in order to
maintain a derivative action designed to attack a transaction
which occurred prior to the purchase of the stock, '48 and made
no finding that Slick Corporation had purchased Filtrol Corpo-
ration's stock for the purpose of bringing the suit."' Mechanical
application of the contemporaneous ownership rule in this case
may have resulted in an inequitable denial of legal relief to an
injured stockholder.
B. Disparate Treatment of Shareholders
An inflexible contemporaneous ownership rule may also lead
to disparate treatment of shareholders based solely on their po-
sitions in the corporation. For example, any shareholder who can
control the corporation may cause the corporation to bring an
action against the wrongdoers.50 Accordingly, an investor who
purchases a controlling interest after a wrongful transaction
need not resort to a derivative action; therefore, the contempo-
raneous ownership rule is inapplicable to him. On the other
hand, an investor who cannot control the corporation's board of
directors can seek redress only by means of a derivative action,
and, if he purchases the shares after the wrongful transaction,
In any derivative suit instituted by a stockholder of a corporation, it shall be
averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the corporation at
the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his stock thereafter
devolved upon him by operation of law.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1974).
48. Nickson v. Filtrol Corp., 262 A.2d 267, 269 (Del. Ch. 1970) (quoting Newkirk v.
W.J. Rainey, Inc., 31 Del. Ch. 433, 76 A.2d 121 (1950)).
49. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs charged that the directors had caused the corpora-
tion to continue to hold the bonds after their decline in value, resulting in additional
corporate loss. The plaintiff also charged that, after the bond purchase, the defendants
made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the value of the bonds. The court re-
jected these arguments that the wrong continued or that new and independent wrongs
occurred after the bond purchase and existed at the time that the plaintiffs did own the
stock. Id. at 269-70. For a discussion of the continuing wrong doctrine, see notes 74-90
and accompanying text infra.
50. The New York State Constitution provides all corporations with the power to
sue in all New York State courts. N.Y.S. CONST. art. 10, § 4. This same power is provided
in the New York Business Corporation Law. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(2) (McKin-




his action is barred by the contemporaneous ownership rule.
Thus, shareholders who have suffered the same injury are, in ef-
fect, accorded different treatment.
Shareholders who are directors or officers of the corporation
may avoid section 626(b); section 720 of the New York Business
Corporation Law51 permits an officer or director, among others,
to bring suit against other officers and directors, if the suit al-
leges certain specific types of misconduct.52 The plaintiff is not
subject to the contemporaneous ownership rule; he has a statu-
tory basis for his action and, therefore, is not bringing a share-
holder's derivative action.53 Accordingly, an investor who
purchases his shares after the wrongful conduct may avoid the
contemporaneous ownership requirement if he becomes an of-
ficer or director of the corporation and then initiates suit under
section 720.1
51. N.Y. Bus. Corns. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-1980) provides:
(a) An action may be brought against one or more dirtctors or officers of a
corporation to procure a judgment for the following relief:
(1) To compel the defendant to account for his official conduct in the follow-
ing cases:
(A) The neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his duties in
the management and disposition of corporate assets committed to his charge.
(B) The acquisition by himself, transfer to others, loss or waste of corporate
assets due to any neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his duties.
(2) To set aside an unlawful conveyance, assignment or transfer of corporate
assets, where the transferee knew of its unlawfulness.
(3) To enjoin a proposed unlawful conveyance, assignment or transfer of
corporate assets, where there is sufficient evidence that it will be made.
(b) An action may be brought for the relief provided in this section, and in
paragraph (a) of section 719 (Liability of directors in certain cases) by a corpora-
tion, or a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, officer, director or judgment creditor
thereof, or, under section 626 (Shareholders' derivative action brought in the right
of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor), by a shareholder, voting
trust certificate holder, or the owner of a beneficial interest in shares thereof.
(c) This section shall not affect any liability otherwise imposed by law upon
any director or officer.
52. Section 720 represents an exception to the general rule that a corporation's af-
fairs are to be managed by its board of directors acting as a group. See notes 45 and 50
supra.
53. See Conant v. Schnall, 33 A.D.2d 326, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 902 (3d Dep't 1970); Alan
v. Landau-Alan Gallery, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 350, 320 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1971). In Conant, the court decided that, because an action under § 720 is not derivative,
"none of the traditional rules (e.g., demand, stock ownership, judicial approval of settle-
ments) surrounding a derivative action apply." 33 A.D.2d at 328, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 904.




Section 720's discrimination in favor of the subsequent pur-
chaser who becomes an officer or director has been justified on
the theory that a shareholder who holds a significant corporate
position will not have acquired his shares for the purpose of ini-
tiating a strike suit.55 Particularly in small or closely held corpo-
rations, however, many investors who do not hold positions enti-
tling them to invoke section 720 may be similarly devoid of
improper motive.5 In addition, not every investor will have the
opportunity to become an officer or director. Thus, the contem-
poraneous ownership statute,7 in conjunction with section 720,
creates a situation in which some subsequent shareholders can
bring suit, while others, who have suffered a similar injury,
cannot.
This disparate treatment may be illustrated as follows: A
purchases a 30% non-controlling interest in Alpha Corporation,
while B purchases a 30% non-controlling interest in Beta Corpo-
ration. Each corporation has a three member board of directors.
The Alpha directors are elected by straight ballot58 while Beta's
certificate of incorporation permits cumulative voting 9 in the
temporaneous ownership requirement:
Especial note should be made of the fact that although a stockholder is barred by
this restrictive legislation, in my opinion a director is not; consequently in a small
corporation, a stockholder who can have himself elected a director may thereafter
sue as a director for wrongs before he became a stockholder, if the wrongs are
within the statute of limitations. The suit is then not technically a stockholder's
suit, but the redress in dollars will be even greater.
Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942, 951 (1947).
55. See 3 WHITE, NEW YORK CORPORATIONS T 720.02 (13th ed. 1978).
56. See note 35 supra.
57. For the text of § 626(b), see note 33 supra.
58. Unless the certificate of incorporation expressly provides otherwise, each share-
holder is entitled to cast one vote per each voting share for each nominee, and directors
are elected by a plurality of votes cast. N.Y. Bus. CosP. LAW §§ 612(a), 614(a) (McKin-
ney 1963 & Supp. 1979-1980). Under this straight ballot procedure, the controlling share-
holders can elect the entire board of directors. In the hypothetical, therefore, A will not
be able to elect any director. Although A, like B, owns 30 shares, A can cast only 30 votes
for each of his nominees for director, while the controlling shareholders would be able to
cast more than 30 votes for each of their nominees.
59. Cumulative voting in the election of directors permits a shareholder to cast an
aggregate of votes equal to the product of the number of shares held and the number of
directors to be elected. Thus, if Beta Corporation has 100 shares outstanding, B owns 30
shares, and three directors are to be elected, B may cast 90 votes. Cumulative voting
affords minority interests the opportunity to be represented on the board of directors
because the shareholder's cumulated votes may be cast entirely for one director. Accord-
[Vol. 1:215
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election of directors. After investing, both A and B discover that
the controlling shareholders wasted their respective corpora-
tion's assets and concealed this mismanagement from both A
and B and from the former shareholders who sold their interests
to A and B. The losses have substantially undermined the values
of A's and B's respective stockholdings.
The contemporaneous ownership rule bars either A or B
from bringing a shareholder's derivative action to compel the
corporation to recover these losses. Since neither has control of
his respective corporation, neither can cause the corporation to
sue in its own name.60 In addition, no suit may be maintained
against the former shareholders since they neither participated
in, nor knew of, the wrongful acts.6 1 B, however, can elect him-
self as a director by cumulatively voting his shares, and, as a
director, bring suit under section 720. B will thus be able to ob-
tain relief. A cannot because he cannot elect himself as a direc-
tor.2 As this illustration demonstrates, the New York statutes
may operate together arbitrarily to protect only certain
ingly, B can cast all his 90 votes for his nominee. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 364 (2d ed. 1970).
The formula that determines the number of shares needed to elect a given number
of directors when cumulative -voting is permitted is as follows:
xY XN1±
N +-{ 1
X = number of shares needed to elect a given number of directors; Y = total number of
shares at meeting; N' = number of directors desired to elect; N = total number of di-
rectors to be elected. See Mills, The Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 1968 DUKE L.J.
28 (discussing this basic formula and the mathematical problems involved in cumulative
voting).




By voting his 30 shares cumulatively, B can elect one director.
Cumulative voting is permitted in New York only if expressly provided for in a cor-
poration's certificate of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney 1963).
60. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
61. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
62. If either investor can become a corporate officer, he can use § 720 to circumvent




C. Judicial Approaches to Problems Caused by the Contem-
poraneous Ownership Rule
The courts in New York have had occasion to reduce the
disparity in the application of the Rule; these courts have ex-
tended the contemporaneous ownership rule to prohibit some
suits brought by the corporation itself.63 Other courts have miti-
gated the harshness of strict application of the Rule by permit-
ting suits under the continuing wrong doctrine." In either case,
the judicial approach has been less than satisfactory.
Application of the contemporaneous ownership rule may
have been carried to its extreme in the appellate division's deci-
sion in Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass." In Capitol
Wine, a shareholder had acquired 100% ownership of the corpo-
ration and, acting through its board of directors, had caused the
corporation to sue its former officers and directors for an alleged
misappropriation and wasting of corporate assets that had oc-
curred prior to the shareholder's purchase. The court applied
the contemporaneous ownership rule and dismissed the corpora-
tion's suit. The court reasoned that
[i]f a corporation may not recover due to the fact that all of the
"stockholders are so circumstanced that no relief should be af-
forded them. . ." it makes little difference whether they have be-
come so circumstanced due to having ratified unanimously the
acts of officers and directors, . . . or whether all of the stockhold-
ers would be prevented from suing by [the contemporaneous own-
ership rule]."
63. See notes 65-72 and accompanying text infra.
64. See notes 74-90 and accompanying text infra.
65. 277 A.D. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1950), afl'd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d
704 (1951).
66. Id. at 187, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 294 (quoting Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb.
644, 664, 93 N.W. 1024, 1031 (1903)). It should be noted that the majority relied heavily
on Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903), which had, based on
equitable principles of unjust enrichment, extended the rule to corporate actions in a
case involving a similar situation. The predominant consideration was that none of the
shareholders could have brought a derivative action individually and yet the entire re-
covery would have benefited them and no other shareholders. Id. at 664, 93 N.W. at
1031.




Justice Shientag's dissent emphasized that the sole purpose of
the statute was to prevent certain derivative actions, not to cur-
tail actions brought by the corporation itself.17
ble and an unjust enrichment to permit" a corporate action which would benefit the sole
shareholder, who had purchased his shares on the "basis of disclosed and guaranteed
assets," by allowing him to "secure for himself through the medium of the corporation
more than he bought." 277 A.D. 184, 189-90, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291, 297 (1st Dep't 1950)
(Peck, J., concurring), afl'd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
By a five to four majority, the Supreme Court in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), followed the reasoning of Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903) and Capitol Wine in applying the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement to a corporate action brought in federal court. In
Bangor Punta, Amoskeag Company purchased 98.3% of the shares of Bangor & Aroos-
took Railroad from Bangor Punta Corporation through its wholly owned subsidiary,
Bangor Punta Operations. Amoskeag later acquired additional shares of the railroad, giv-
ing it 99% ownership. Amoskeag then, under federal and state law, sued Bangor Punta
Corporation and Bangor Punta Operations for various acts of mismanagement occurring
during the years that the defendants controlled the railroad and before the plaintiff ac-
quired its interest. The Court held that as to the causes of action under the federal
antitrust and securities laws,
where equity would preclude the shareholders from maintaining an action in their
own right, the corporation would also be precluded. It follows that Amoskeag, the
principal beneficiary of any recovery and itself estopped from complaining of peti-
tioners' alleged wrongs, cannot avoid the command of equity through the guise of
proceeding in the name of respondent corporations which it owns and controls.
417 U.S. at 713 (citations omitted).
This decision accords with Barber and Capitol Wine, but goes a step further than
either of these cases. In both Barber and Capitol Wine, corporate suits were barred
when the controlling shareholders owned 100% of the corporate plaintiffs. Thus, there
were no minority shareholders in Barber or Capitol Wine. Bangor Punta, however, pro-
hibited a corporate suit in a situation in which the controlling shareholder owned less
than 100% of the shares, albeit only 1% less. In Bangor Punta, 20 minority shareholders
could have satisfied the contemporaneous ownership requirement. Id. at 712 n. 8.
As the dissent in Bangor Punta indicated, although the majority purported to rely
on Barber, dictum in Barber indicates a different result in a situation like Bangor Punta,
which involves minority shareholders:
[If any of the present shareholders may complain of prior acts of mismanage-
ment,] "there can be no doubt of the right and duty of the corporation to main-
tain this suit. It would be maintainable in such a case even though the wrong-
doers continued to be [shareholders] and would share in the proceeds."
Id. at 720 (quoting Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 655, 93 N.W. 1024, 1028
(1903)) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, if any present shareholder held his shares at the
time of the alleged wrongs, it would appear that Barber does not prohibit either a corpo-
rate or derivative action. In Bangor Punta, any of 20 minority shareholders could have
sued derivatively. As the dissent notes, "It is ironic, then, to see the Court adopt a result
which bars the corporation itself from bringing a suit which a minority shareholder could
have brought in the corporation's behalf." Id. at 722 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. 277 A.D. at 190-91, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98 (1st Dep't 1950) (Shientag, J., dissent-




Neither the majority nor the dissent was concerned, how-
ever, with a more fundamental problem created by application
of the Rule in Capitol Wine. By using the contemporaneous
ownership rule to bar an action brought by a corporation, the
shares of which were owned by a sole shareholder who had pur-
chased his interest after the alleged wrong had taken place, the
court created, in effect, three categories of shareholders: minor-
ity shareholders, shareholders owning 100% of the shares, and
controlling shareholders owning less than 100% of the shares.
After Capitol Wine, it appeared that, of these three groups, only
controlling shareholders owning less than a 100% interest could
avoid the contemporaneous ownership requirement by causing
the corporation to bring suit in its own name. Thus, by creating
these three categories, the court ensured disparate treatment of
shareholders based on their relative ownership in the corpora-
tion. Further, by mechanically applying the Rule to a corpora-
tion, the court encouraged unthinking application in circum-
stances in which such application might deny legal relief to
injured minority shareholders.
Fourteen years later, in Platt Corp. v. Platt,68 Capitol Wine
was distinguished, and the appellate division held the contempo-
raneous ownership rule applicable only in derivative actions.
The action was brought by Platt Corporation which was con-
trolled by Adson Industries, a corporation that had acquired its
shares from one Platt, who had been the former president of the
plaintiff corporation and who was a defendant in this litigation.
After institution of the suit, Platt Corporation was merged into
Adson Industries. The merger agreement, which was negotiated
before the initiation of the litigation, included an undertaking
by Adson Industries to bring suit against Platt and others and to
tender the proceeds of the suit to the former Platt Corporation
minority shareholders. After consummation of the merger, the
defendants successfully moved to dismiss the action because the
plaintiff corporation currently had no shareholder that had held
might be barred from recovery. Id.
For critical discussions of the decision, see 36 CORNELL, L.Q. 740 (1951); 65 HARV. L.
REV. 345 (1951); 3 STAN. L. REV. 151 (1950).
68. 21 A.D.2d 116, 249 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dep't 1964), a/I'd, 15 N.Y.2d 705, 204
N.E.2d 495, 256 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1965).
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shares at the time of the alleged wrongful acts. In reversing the
trial court's dismissal, the appellate division stated that the cor-
poration had a separate right to sue even though none of the
shareholders would have been able to sue derivatively.6 9 The
court noted that, in some cases, "policy or equitable considera-
tions may require that the rights of a corporation be equated
with the rights of its [shareholders] and that the corporate
rights be subjected to the statutory limitations. 7 0 In the view of
the Platt court, Capitol Wine was such a case because the latter
action was brought for the exclusive benefit of the sole share-
holder and, thus, would have resulted in unjust enrichment.7 1
The court further reasoned that Adson Industries had not be-
come the sole shareholder of Platt Corporation, but rather had
eliminated all Platt Corporation stock through the merger. In
addition, the real party in interest was found to be the class of
shareholders who had exchanged their shares in Platt Corpora-
tion for shares in Adson Industries, since those shareholders
were to receive the proceeds of any recovery.72
Platt is significant in that the court refused to apply the
contemporaneous ownership rule mechanically to actions by cor-
porations, but instead investigated the facts and circumstances
of the case to determine the equities of the situation. Although a
consideration of the equities might be appropriate in both deriv-
ative suits and corporate actions, Platt has not been so ex-
tended. As a result, some shareholders, those who control a cor-
poration, are able to circumvent the contemporaneous ownership
rule, while minority shareholders, who cannot cause the corpora-
tion to sue, will still be deprived of legal relief 73
Both state and federal courts, seeking to mitigate the harsh-
ness of the contemporaneous ownership rule, have occasionally
resorted to the continuing wrong doctrine in order to permit a
shareholder to bring a derivative action.7 4 Under this doctrine, a
69. Id. at 121-22, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81.
70. Id. at 121-22, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
71. Id. at 122, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
72. Id. at 123, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 82. For a discussion of Capitol Wine and Platt, see
Note, Demise of the Doctrine of Capitol Wine and Spirit v. Pokrass, 18 BUFFALO L. REv.
184 (1969).
73. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
74. See, e.g., Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969) (suit permit-
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shareholder may sue derivatively whenever he demonstrates that
the alleged wrong was still occurring at the time he purchased
his interest, regardless of when the wrongful conduct began.
Courts have applied the "continuing wrong" theory upon a find-
ing that the wrong "spans [the plaintiff's] ownership of stock or
new elements in a pattern of wrongful conduct occur after acqui-
sition, and the wrong has not completely occurred and been ter-
minated prior to the stock acquisition." '75
The continuing wrong rationale has been employed by New
York courts on several occasions to satisfy the requirement of
contemporaneous ownership. The courts appear to be willing to
look for a continuing wrong whenever the facts of a particular
case indicate that the plaintiff is not bringing a strike suit, that
the plaintiff has no reason to expect that the value of his shares
has been undermined by the defendant's actions, and that the
plaintiff has no other basis of recovery against the defendant.7
ted since payment of excessive salaries, personal use of corporate property, payment of
prohibitive mortgage rate, and mismanagement of oil and gas property continued at time
plaintiff reacquired the stock), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Palmer v. Morris, 316
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963) (allegations of exorbitant rentals pursuant to fraudulent trans-
actions did not deal only with transactions that had completely occurred and been termi-
nated prior to plaintiff's acquisition of the stock); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 341 F.
Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (although allegedly invalid lease was entered into by corpora-
tion before plaintiff acquired its stock, complaint alleged a continuing lease and a contin-
uing injury; court noted that the danger of person "buying" a lawsuit was not present);
Lavine v. Gulf Coast Leaseholds, 35 Del. Ch. 539, 122 A.2d 550 (1956) (illegal stock ex-
change not completed until approved by stockholders; since approval not given until af-
ter plaintiff became stockholder, he was not barred from suing); Maclary v. Pleasant
Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (1954) (issuance of stock was authorized, but
certificates were not actually issued until 3 years later; transaction was not completed
until certificates were issued; and plaintiffs, who had become equitably entitled to corpo-
rate stock between date of authorization and date of issuance, were entitled to maintain
suit); Duncan v. National Tea Co., 14 Ill. App.2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771 (1957) (when a
shareholder has acquired his stock after the occurrence of alleged acts of mismanage-
ment, he may maintain a derivative suit only if the mismanagement and its effects con-
tinued and were injurious to him, or the alleged mismanagement affected him specially);
Koplar v. Rosset, 355 Mo. 496, 196 S.W.2d 800 (1946) (acts or irregularities, expenses
pursuant to refinancing bonds, relied upon were continuing ones so [the Rule] would not
apply).
75. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5982 (Supp.
1979) (citing Spalitta v. National Am. Bank of New Orleans, 444 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971)).
76. See Ripley v. International. Rys. of Cent. America, 8 A.D.2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d
62 (1st Dep't 1959), afl'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960); Gluck
v. Unger, 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960); York Proper-
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In these situations, the New York courts apparently have recog-
nized that application of the contemporaneous ownership rule
would penalize the subsequent purchaser of shares for failure to
discover the wrong before his acquisition and would allow ineq-
uitable gains to the defendants.7 Problems arise because no
guidelines have been established for determining the existence
of a continuing wrong. This leads to decisions which appear con-
tradictory and provide no clear precedent for future application.
In York Properties, Inc. v. Neidoif,78 the defendant direc-
tors defaulted on a corporate mortgage held by their daughter
and against which the principal assets of the corporation had
been pledged. Although the plaintiff acquired his 50% interest
after the default, he did so prior to the foreclosure. The court
held that the action could be maintained since it found a contin-
uing wrong; the default, which was intended to force a sale of
the corporate assets, was a single transaction that included the
date of default and continued to the date of foreclosure.7 9
In Gluck v. Unger,80 Green Company had acquired Olen
Company through a merger. The directors of Green then sued
Olen alleging fraud in the merger transaction. This suit was sub-
sequently settled. The plaintiff in Gluck, who acquired his
shares in Green Company sometime after the merger but before
the settlement of the fraud action, then brought a derivative ac-
tion against the Green directors alleging an improper settlement
of the fraud action. The court held that a settlement which is a
"cover-up of the original wrong is a new and independent
wrong."S This statement can be interpreted either as a finding
that the settlement was a "new" and separate wrong, unrelated
to the merger or the fraud action in any way, or as a finding that
the settlement was a "cover-up" or continuation of a series of
wrongs beginning with the tainted merger. Under either inter-
ties, Inc. v. Neidoff, 10 Misc. 2d 439, 170 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957). But
see Weinstein v. Behn, 65 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946), aff'd, 272 A.D.
1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1947). See also notes 15-16 and accompanying text
supra.
77. See note 16 supra.
78. 10 Misc. 2d 439, 170 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
79. Id. at 441, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
80. 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).




pretation, the result in Gluck is an example of a court avoiding
mechanical application of the contemporaneous ownership rule.
In Ripley v. International Railways of Central America,82
two appellate courts, like the court in Gluck, avoided application
of the contemporaneous ownership rule by relying upon events
occurring after the plaintiffs acquired their shares.8 s The appel-
late division found that payments under an unfavorable freight
agreement, entered into prior to the time at which the plaintiffs
had become shareholders, were "continuing wrongs," and there-
fore, the shareholders could sue derivatively. s4 On appeal, the
court of appeals upheld, on a different ground, the shareholders'
right to sue: the payments were not being made pursuant to the
freight agreement, but rather, each payment was a separate
transaction subject to suit by the shareholders on a theory of
unjust enrichment.8 5
Other New York cases are difficult to reconcile with Neidoif,
Gluck, and Ripley. In White v. Phillips,s for instance, the New
York supreme court found that the failure to regain amounts il-
legally paid by the corporation on debts for which it was not
obligated was not an independent wrong. 7 In Chaft v. Kass,"
the appellate division found that continuing payments pursuant
to an agreement to buy formulae and processes from the former
sole shareholder of the corporation did not constitute a continu-
ing wrong. 9 The court reasoned that the wrongdoing in making
payments would have to be founded upon a setting aside of the
contract which the court found to be more advantageous than an
earlier licensing agreement that had been entered into while the
original owner still owned all of the shares.90
82. 8 A.D.2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d
443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960).
83. Even if these courts had applied the contemporaneous ownership rule, they
would not have had to dismiss this derivative suit since two of the twenty-seven plain-
tiffs had owned shares in the defendant corporation at the time of the original wrongful
conduct. Id. at 324, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
84. Id. at 324, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
85. 8 N.Y.2d 430, 445-46, 171 N.E.2d 443, 450, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289, 299-300 (1960).
86. 185 Misc. 960, 58 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
87. Id. at 961-62, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54.
88. 19 A.D.2d 610, 241 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1963).





White can be distinguished from Gluck and Ripley in that
in White there was no subsequent act, but only a failure to take
action, and from Neidoff in that in White there was no subse-
quent event like a foreclosure. Chaft, on the other hand, cannot
be distinguished from Gluck and Ripley on the basis of subse-
quent action since in Chaft payments were made subsequent to
the original agreement. The only distinction that can be drawn
between Chaft and Ripley seems to be that, in Chaft, the court
found the contract to be both advantageous and controlling,
whereas, in Ripley, the court of appeals found the original agree-
ment neither advantageous nor controlling. Thus, while some
distinctions can be drawn between those cases that find a con-
tinuing wrong and those that do not, these distinctions do not
seem significant enough to warrant different outcomes.
In sum, the continuing wrong doctrine mitigates injustice
that might otherwise result from broad application of the con-
temporaneous ownership rule. The cases, however, give no clear
indication of those circumstances that will compel application of
the continuing wrong doctrine and those that will not. Plaintiff-
shareholders are left with little guidance, and courts are forced
to decide, on a case by case basis, as to whether a situation con-
stitutes a continuing wrong.
III. A Proposed Legislative Solution
The New York legislature should attempt to correct the in-
equities resulting from application of the contemporaneous own-
ership rule. In determining the appropriate course to take, the
legislature should recognize the continued necessity for the con-
temporaneous ownership rule and the ineffectiveness of the con-
tinuing wrong doctrine as a remedy for the problems engendered
by the Rule. This comment urges a modification of section
626(b) of the New York Business Corporation Law to create a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the contemporaneous owner-
ship rule.
Although many of the abuses created by strike suits have
been eliminated by sections 626(d) and (e) of the New York
Business Corporation Law,91 a contemporaneous ownership rule




may still be necessary. Section 626(d) requires court approval
for personal settlement or abandonment of shareholders' deriva-
tive actions, and 626(e) requires the suing shareholder to remit
the proceeds of the action to the corporation so that all share-
holders may benefit therefrom. Together, then, the sections pre-
vent an individual from purchasing several shares of stock, com-
mencing a derivative action, and then personally settling or
abandoning that action for substantial personal gain. These sec-
tions, however, only apply after a derivative action is instituted.
They do not affect prelitigation settlements. Without the con-
temporaneous ownership requirement, an individual could con-
ceivably purchase several shares of stock, threaten a suit, and
obtain a large out-of-court settlement from a corporation inter-
ested in preventing expensive and protracted litigation, main-
taining its public and private image, or protecting trade secrets.
Thus, the strike suit abuse at which the contemporaneous own-
ership rule was aimed might recur."
Assuming the continued necessity for a contemporaneous
ownership requirement, the hardships that the Rule causes must
be considered. In order to mitigate the harshness of the Rule,
the legislature could mandate application of the continuing
wrong doctrine" whenever it is found that a shareholder held
his shares during a period in which the alleged wrong continued
and that adherence to the contemporaneous ownership rule
would cause injustice. Three problems might result from such a
statutory provision. First, a wrong does not continue in all situa-
tions. Therefore, relief would not be afforded to all injured
shareholders. Second, merely enacting the continuing wrong doc-
trine would not provide standards or guidelines for identifying
those situations that constitute a continuing wrong and there-
fore satisfy the contemporaneous ownership requirement. Third,
statutory adoption might make strike suits more appealing; an
investor, could purchase shares after a wrongdoing began with
the knowledge that he could threaten suit and obtain a personal
settlement.
The most effective solution to the problems created by the
92. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
93. Maine and Wisconsin have statutorily adopted the continuing wrong doctrine.




Rule would entail amendment of the contemporaneous owner-
ship statute to provide for equitable exceptions to its applica-
tion. The Rule would continue to deter strike suits, while the
amendment would permit the courts to allow suits to go forward
in situations in which the Rule itself would work an injustice.
Both Pennsylvania and California have enacted such modified
contemporaneous ownership rules.94 In these states, any share-
holder may sue derivatively, regardless of when he acquired his
corporate interest, if he demonstrates that denial of such an ac-
tion would result in substantial injustice. 5 Both statutes require
that the plaintiff show a strong prima facie case in favor of the
derivative claim. Pennsylvania then requires proof that, without
the suit, serious injustice would result.96 California requires four
specific additional showings: that no similar action has been, or
is likely to be, instituted; that the plaintiff acquired his shares
before public or private disclosure of the wrongdoing; that with-
out the suit the defendant will be unjustly enriched by his own
willful wrongdoing; and that the suit will not unjustly enrich the
corporation or any shareholder thereoL97 California provides
courts with clear requisites for application of this modification
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1979-1980); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977).
95. The Pennsylvania statute provides:
[Any shareholder ... who except for this fcontemporaneous ownership] section
would be entitled to maintain such a suit and who does not meet such require-
ments, may, nevertheless, in the discretion of the court, be allowed to maintain
such a suit on preliminary showing to the court . . . that there is a strong prima
facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation and that
without such suit serious injustice will result.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1979-1980).
The California statute provides:
[A]ny shareholder who does not meet such [contemporaneous ownership] require-
ments may nevertheless be allowed in the discretion of the court to maintain such
action on a preliminary showing to and determination by the court . . . that (i)
there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the
corporation, (ii) no other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted, (iii)
the plaintiff acquired the shares before there was disclosure to the public or to the
plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which plaintiff complains, (iv) unless the action can
be maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived from defendant's willful
breach of a fiduciary duty, and (v) the requested relief will not result in unjust
enrichment of the corporation or any shareholder of the corporation.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977).
96. See note 95 supra.
97. See note 95 supra.
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of the Rule, while Pennsylvania allows judicial flexibility in de-
termining when to apply the equitable exception.
This writer has found no judicial interpretations of these
statutes. It appears, however, that a shareholder suing in Cali-
fornia is certain of what he must prove in order to avoid applica-
tion of the Rule; in Pennsylvania the shareholder must foresee
what the court will deem a denial of justice. On the other hand,
a shareholder suing in California has an extremely heavy burden
of proof. It may be difficult to prove that no similar actions are
likely to be instituted and that no one will be unjustly enriched
by the relief requested. In addition, a defendant is not necessar-
ily unjustly enriched by wasting corporate assets. Therefore, his
liability should not be premised on such enrichment.
To provide ease of application for courts, certainty of proof
for plaintiffs, and equitable results, the New York legislature
could supplement section 626(b) as follows:
Any shareholder who does not meet the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirements of this section may nevertheless be allowed, in
the discretion of the court, to maintain such action on a prelimi-
nary showing to the court that there is a strong prima facie case
in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation and
that, without such suit, serious injustice would result.
In determining whether justice requires maintenance of such
action, the court should consider whether or not (1) a similar ac-
tion has been or is likely to be instituted, (2) the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the wrongdoing before he purchased his
shares, (3) without the action the defendant will be unjustly en-
riched by the defendant's willful breach of a fiduciary duty, and
(4) the requested relief will result in unjust enrichment of the cor-
poration or of any shareholder.
In an attempt to reach a just result in each case, this proposed
statute incorporates both the specific guidelines of the California
statute and the flexibility of the Pennsylvania rule. The plaintiff
must demonstrate a strong prima facie case plus serious danger
of injustice if his case is barred. The court then must consider
the enumerated factors; the presence or absence of one or more,
however, is not necessarily dispositive of the plaintiff's claim to
standing. This amendment would continue to deter strike suits,
but strained interpretations of the contemporaneous ownership




nials of legal relief. In addition, since shareholders would no
longer need to circumvent the Rule by use of section 720 or by
controlling the board of directors, arbitrary treatment resulting
from such circumvention would be alleviated."8
IV. Conclusion
The requirement of contemporaneous ownership in share-
holders' derivative actions has been widely adopted by courts
and legislatures. Although the contemporaneous ownership rule
was originally designed to prevent abuse of federal diversity ju-
risdiction, it has functioned at the state level to curtail various
derivative action abuses and improprieties. In New York, as in
many other jurisdictions, however, the requirement may deny le-
gal relief to innocent shareholders and, in conjunction with other
statutes, may result in disparate treatment of shareholders de-
pending upon their positions in the corporation. To prevent such
inequities, the New York contemporaneous ownership statute
should be amended so that courts may exempt shareholders
from the contemporaneous ownership requirement if, after a
consideration of all the relevant circumstances, it appears that
justice so requires.
98. See notes 40-90 and accompanying text supra.
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